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Nietzsche on Language and Our 
Pursuit of Truth
Le Quyen Pham
Language—how it influences how we perceive the world and what it makes us think and do—is one of the major themes in the phi-
losophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Language, for Nietzsche, poses fundamen-
tal philosophical questions, with implications for our relation to truth and 
our search to understand what we take to be the kernel of existence under-
lying the façade of grammar. Drawing materials from across Nietzsche’s 
many writings, Tracy Strong has created a coherent picture of the philoso-
pher’s understanding of the relation between language, thought, and real-
ity.1 Strong ascribes to Nietzsche three major claims: that language shapes 
both knowledge about reality and reality itself, that language bounds our 
thought, understanding, and behavior within the reality it constructs, and 
that language necessitates an epistemology of nihilism in which we seek to 
know what we know cannot be known—namely the truth. Strong describes 
three epistemological prejudices engendered by linguistic categories that 
condition and limit the way we perceive and understand our world, namely 
the subject-object distinction, freedom of the will, and the sequencing of 
cause and effect. The subject-object distinction in turn contributes to the 
emergence of consciousness as well as an ahistorical view of human nature.
By looking at further passages by Nietzsche overlooked by Strong, 
I will both refine and extend his interpretation. I will show that all of the 
so-called prejudices identified above—subjectivity, agency, causality, con-
sciousness, and ahistoricity—arise as consequences of a single feature of 
1 Tracy B. Strong, “Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Critique of Epistemolo-
gy,” Theory and Society 3 (1976): 239–263.
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grammar, what I will call the subject-predicate sentence. Furthermore, I will 
expand on a sixth effect of language on our epistemology, one of familiarity, 
which Strong only briefly mentions. I begin by exploring the metaphysical 
implications of epistemological readings of Nietzsche’s remarks, in order to 
extend the interpretation from how Nietzsche thinks language creates and 
informs our knowledge of the world to what he may have implied about the 
nature of the world.
Language, Thought, and Reality
Nietzsche’s remarks on language are to be compiled from volumes of his 
writings, from which one idea is manifest: in using language to talk about 
reality, we already presuppose reality; we take our language to express truths 
and the words of our language to be the sound-forms of concepts “out there 
in the world.” Yet we are only a species of “clever animals [which] invented 
cognition,” deceived by our own invention; there is no single truth, no con-
cepts independent of language, no one reality outside of us that causes our 
cognitive activity. The evidence lies in the simple observation that there are 
many languages: “Where words are concerned, what matters is never truth, 
never the full and adequate expression; otherwise there would not be so 
many languages.”2 Since there are many languages, and since reality looks 
different in different languages, if each language captures reality, then either 
there is no single reality, or each language does not fully and adequately 
capture reality. Nietzsche seems to lean towards the first possibility: there is 
no “true,” absolute reality; the world that appears to us “is the only world” 
and “the ‘true world’ is just a lie added on to it.”3 Note that Nietzsche shuns 
the traditional distinction in philosophy between reality and appearance: 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in The Birth 
of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ron-
ald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 139–153.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Ham-
mer in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. 
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 153-230.
The ExpositoR   60
for him, what is apparent is what is real.
Such a radical view on the effects of language on human epistemol-
ogy is reminiscent of the Kantian structure of the mental faculty, in which 
the structure of human cognition determines the structure of experienced 
reality, in such a way that our experience of what Kant calls “things-in-
themselves” contributes to them fundamental features such as substance-
hood, causality, and necessity. For Nietzsche, however, the direction of de-
termination goes back even further: the categories of language define the 
structure of human cognition, thereby defining the structure of reality. This, 
however, does not mean that language shapes thought, which in turn shapes 
reality, for the human mind has no such power. Rather, language shapes 
thought, which is about reality, the reality it presupposes. In this sense, our 
epistemology is determined by our language: linguistic capacity is a neces-
sary condition for the possibility of knowledge, and the conceptual appa-
ratus with which we perceive, experience, and hence come to “know” the 
world is essentially linguistic.
In Strong’s words, “The regularities which are our life are engen-
dered and supported in language.”4 Language, for Nietzsche, “serves a dou-
ble function”: it is both “the means by which we construct the world,” and 
“the tools by which [we] must deal with the world,” that is, by which we 
make sense of our life and activity.5 The two functions are complementary: 
linguistic structures provide the framework in which reality is experienced, 
and the framework within which reality, both human life and activity and 
the rest of nature, is to be understood.
Note the ambiguity in Strong’s claim that with language “we con-
struct the world,” and that “language makes the world present”: either each 
language individually creates a world, which becomes “the” world for its 
speakers, or there is the world, which each language reinterprets or recon-
structs differently, with that reconstruction then becoming the only world 
known to its speakers.6 In the first interpretation, there is no absolute reality 
4 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 242.
5 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 242.
6 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 242.
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but only relativized realities. In the second interpretation, there are both an 
absolute reality and relativized realities. In both interpretations, human un-
derstanding is supplied with the presentation of only their relativized world, 
which contains only relativized truths. Yet we are convinced that there is 
such a thing as the absolute world: “the mind is only seeking to persuade 
itself that the world it knows is the one true world. …We have projected the 
world with a distorted lens, yet the vision is taken as real.”7
The first, stronger interpretation is more plausible, given Nietzsche’s 
general philosophical objection to the idea of a “true world.” Languages do 
not only embody different worldviews, but rather they describe different 
worlds. Our reality is the reality as our language presents it to us. It is not 
that we see “the” reality through the colors and shapes of language, but we 
each see our own reality through the colors and shapes of our own language. 
There is no single, “true” truth, but only an illusion of one, and a multiplic-
ity of truths presented in languages. Nietzsche famously declares: “What, 
then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors. …Truths are illusions of which 
we have forgotten that they are illusions.”8 Our grasp of truth is legislated 
or conditioned by the structure of our own language: “The legislation of 
language also produces the first laws of truth.”9
At first, Strong seems committed only to the second, less radical in-
terpretation: the means by which we construct reality, language is thus really 
the veil or lens through which we see reality, i.e. think about, understand, 
form beliefs about, and come to know the “real” reality. In certain passages 
Nietzsche seems to suggest the same point, that there is a world (“the other 
world”) besides the world that our language constructs: “Mankind set up 
in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be 
so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its 
hinges and make itself master of it…[Man] really thought that in language 
he possessed knowledge of the [‘other’] world.”10
7   Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 246.
8   Nietzsche, “On Truth,” 146.
9   Nietzsche, “On Truth,” 143.
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. 
R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), I:§11.
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Nevertheless, this other, true world, the presupposed “realm which 
could not be shaped by language and which would not be co-terminous 
with language,” would be nonetheless ineffable and hence unknowable, 
and therefore, Strong concludes, there could not possibly be such a world.11 
If there were, then it would serve as a “scale” on which languages can be 
ranked by the degree of correctness in representation. Yet, Strong argues, 
such a scale would imply an unknowable world, and therefore there can be 
no such scale, and therefore there is no such world-in-itself.12 Because we 
can only think and know through the medium of language (“if there were 
not language, then one really wouldn’t know what to say about the world”), 
the forms of reality that lie beneath or beyond linguistic forms are also be-
yond the reaches of human cognition, in the same way that Kant’s things-
in-themselves are beyond the limits of human experience.13 The structure 
of our language may presuppose a reality that is to be known, a “public,” 
absolute, eternal reality where “Truth” resides, yet such a reality is (“by defi-
nition”) not knowable and therefore not possible.14
Nietzsche gives a similar argument from limitedness for the claim 
that there is no reference to the true world in language: “The ‘thing-in-it-
self’…is impossible for even the creator of language to grasp.…He desig-
nates only the relations of things to human beings.”15 Because words are 
created to refer to the contents of human experience, that is, because the 
creation of words is tied to or limited by human experience, whatever lies 
beyond experience necessarily cannot be spoken of and therefore cannot 
appear, even by metaphor, in language. The illusion of a world-in-itself is 
only a “philosophical mythology ... concealed in language”: “we do not only 
designate things with [the word and the concept], we think originally that 
through them we grasp the true in things.”16
Yet Nietzsche’s claim is stronger: not only do we not find in lan-
11 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 243.
12 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 245–46.
13 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 242.
14 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 246.
15 Nietzsche, “On Truth,” 144.
16 Nietzsche, Human, “Wanderer,” §11.
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guage evidence of an absolute reality, but there is no absolute reality, no one 
true world. The conclusion of Strong’s main argument above from epis-
temological impossibility to metaphysical impossibility thus seems to be a 
correct interpretation of Nietzsche. Even when Nietzsche would grant that 
there is no metaphysical or epistemological contradiction in either the no-
tion of things-in-themselves or that of the one true world, to conclude, as 
Strong and Nietzsche do, based on the mere fact that they are indescribable, 
unknowable, or unexperienceable that they cannot exist in any sense, is to 
subscribe to a materialist and empiricist view of the world, which Nietzsche 
does and stresses in his philosophy. Kant’s things-in-themselves have been 
rejected by the same line of argument: because things-in-themselves are 
outside of experience, the notion of them is not even sensible. Of such tran-
scendental objects Nietzsche writes: “Absolutely nothing will be heard, with 
the associated acoustic illusion that if nothing is heard, nothing is there.”17
The veil of words and our epistemological prejudices
Thus we perceive and know the world only through language; language is 
our mediation to reality—a relativized, man-made reality, but one which 
we take to be absolute. The genealogy of language is thus the genealogy of 
the world, and hence the genealogy of truth (again, both “the world” and 
“truth” are to be understood in the relativized sense). The trio thing-in-it-
self–concept–word is often confused: the word signifies the concept, which 
purportedly captures the putative “thing-in-itself,” but the word is often 
confusedly taken to stand for a thing-in-itself. “We believe that when we 
speak of trees, colours, snows, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things 
themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way 
correspond to the original entities.”18 The “standing for” relation is only a 
17 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are, in The Anti-Christ, 
Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith 
Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
69–152.
18 Nietzsche, “On Truth,” 144.
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metaphorical one; it is rather a series of imitations that modify the original 
in modality. All that we have in the beginning are stimulations of nerves, 
from which mental “images,” i.e., concepts, form (first metaphor), which 
are then expressed in sounds, i.e., words (second metaphor). Each step in 
the transformation has modified the original thing, so that in the end we 
“know” the sound only by the Chladni sand figures that its vibrations cre-
ate.19
Not only does language mediate between us and our reality by way 
of such metaphors, but it does so in particular ways that constitutively de-
termine our understanding of reality. One aphorism of Nietzsche reads: 
“Every word is a prejudice.”20 Strong discusses three such “epistemological 
prejudices” engendered by language that Nietzsche uncovers: subjectivity 
or what Strong calls the “subject-object distinction,” agency or free will, and 
causality or conditionality, along with two consequences of the subject-ob-
ject distinction, namely the “overvaluation” of consciousness and the ten-
dency towards ahistoricity.
These effects of language, while “real,” all seem to be, pace Strong, 
consequences of a single linguistic feature, namely the subject-predicate 
sentence, the “I do.” Because grammar requires at least a subject and a pred-
icate, in the same sentence we talk about doer (“I”) and deed (“do”) as if 
they were separate things (which is the effect of subjectivity); the doer ap-
pears to be free to perform the deed or not (agency); the doer appears to be 
the cause and the deed his effect (causality); the doer, in speaking of his own 
deed, becomes conscious of himself as the agent and cause, i.e. as related to 
but distinct from his actions (consciousness), and assumes an “I” that does 
not change with time, while his actions, which are separate from him, do 
change (ahistoricity).
Thus, the appearance of subjectivity, what Strong terms the “sub-
ject-object distinction,” is rather the subject-predicate distinction. The sep-
aration is of the actor from the action (the verb or verb phrase), i.e. the danc-
er from the dance, or better, from the dancing—as opposed to that of the 
19 Nietzsche, “On Truth,” 144.
20 Nietzsche, Human, “Wanderer,” 55.
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actor from the “actee” or acted (the object), i.e. the dancer from the danced, 
which is what Strong’s terminology seems to suggest. The former is more 
general because the separation is present in both transitive actions (actions 
on an object, e.g., ‘Fire burns people’) and intransitive actions (actions with-
out objects, e.g., ‘Fire burns’).
The separation of the actor from action is underlain by a “substance 
ontology” (as opposed to a “process ontology”): substance ontology sep-
arates the doer from the deed as if they are two separate substances, i.e., 
entities. The result is a tautology, a doubling of facts, a “Tun-Tun” (a do-
ing-doing) that “state[s] the same event twice, once as subject and once as 
[predicate].”21 In Nietzschean terms, we talk as if there is a “being” behind 
the “doing,” a “doer” behind the “deed” who does and wills the deed. We 
say, for example, “Fire burns,” as if there is fire and there is burning that 
is apart from the fire, or “Achilles went to war,” as if going to war is an act 
performed in exactly the same way by many, one of whom happened to be 
Achilles.
This subject-predicate (or actor-action or doer-deed) distinction 
that is inherent in our language is also the source of our epistemological 
prejudices about causality and free agency. The doer is now separate from 
his deed, as if he is the cause of his deed: “The popular mind…doubles the 
deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a deed: it posits the 
same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect.”22 To be the 
cause of something else is to be a free cause of that thing, because it is dis-
tinct from ourselves and not part of our essence or nature, or so our lan-
guage makes us believe; hence the accompanying illusion of freedom in ac-
tion. In the language of the Genealogy, it is the illusion that the strong can be 
taken apart from the expression of his strength, as if he were the cause—and 
free cause—of his strength, as if he were “free to express strength or not 
to do so.”23 We talk about doers and then deeds, as if the doer could have 
21 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 250.
22 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1989), “First Essay,” 
§13.
23 Nietzsche, Genealogy, “First Essay,” §13. 
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performed different deeds, and as if he did what he did only because he 
had chosen to do so. It is in the free agent, then, that we locate the credit 
or merit: We talk as if fire could have not burned and therefore as if fire is 
responsible for the burning, and we praise or blame Achilles for going to war 
because we believe he could have freely chosen to act otherwise.
Another potential source, not described by Strong, of the illusion of 
free will in addition to the subsentential subject-predicate distinction lies in 
the disjoint nature of language, at the sentential level: “Between this fact and 
another fact [we imagine] in addition an empty space, [and thus we isolate] 
every fact.”24 Just as we break up our thought and speech into sentences and 
paragraphs, so we break up the “continuous flux” of existence into individu-
al facts and groups of facts, and the “continuous, homogeneous, undivided, 
indivisible flowing” of doing and becoming into individual, isolated deeds. 
The acts are picked out by language from the chain from which it is inextri-
cable, from the other acts on which it depends and is determined, and in this 
way are taken to be stand-alone, independent, and hence free acts.
From this appearance of the subject-ego on the surface of the sen-
tence, the “I” that chooses to do things and that is distinct from other sub-
jects, the effects of consciousness and ahistoricity follow. The person who 
thinks “I think” locates himself in the subject position, in juxtaposition to 
the predicate, i.e., to what he does as if it were a free and contingent act, as if 
he were exercising his volition from a motive towards a purpose and doing 
so in a morally responsible way. He becomes self-conscious and is able to 
reflect on himself as the agent and cause, both conceptual and moral, of his 
actions. He is unchanging, or so he thinks; his actions are transitory, but it 
is he who persists through time.
Finally, language produces a familiarity effect. Strong briefly men-
tions the instinct for reading familiarity in the unfamiliar as the “Kausal-
ität-Sinn” (sense of causality), i.e. as part of the explanation why we read 
cause and effect into events.25 Yet the familiarity effect extends beyond our 
efforts to comprehend the nature and logic of events. For Strong, the “met-
24 Nietzsche, Human, “Wanderer,” §11.
25 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 254.
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aphorical basis” of our language, i.e. the linguistic mediation between our 
conceptualizations and our reality as it appears to us, takes on a more polit-
ical character: “To name is to define and bring under control; the allocation 
of names creates the world in the image of he who names.”26 This fits in 
with Nietzsche’s iconoclastic position in On the Genealogy of Morals: “...the 
origin of language itself [is] an expression of power on the part of the rulers: 
they say ‘this is this and this,’ they seal every thing and event with a sound 
and, as it were, take possession of it.”27 The strong and brave were the first 
to set down the signification of sounds, the first creators of language, and in 
the world that they created, “good” gets to signify what they are.
To adopt Deleuze’s political expression: it is the linguistic manifes-
tation of the will to power, of the force of “appropriating, possessing, subju-
gating, dominating.”28 To “domesticate” new concepts, we coin new terms 
and borrow expressions from other languages into our own. A concept is 
no longer foreign or alien when we have a word for it, can identify it and 
talk about it. A “stronger” language is one with greater expressive power. It 
absorbs other languages into its vocabulary, coats them in its grammar and 
phonology, and transforms them into an inherent part of itself. Similarly, 
a “stronger” philosophy is one which has incorporated within itself many 
ideas, so that little is left outside its range of discourse. Our philosophical 
manner of talking and thinking about ideas has thus been that of appropri-
ation and domestication: to refer to novelty in familiar terms, to new things 
in terms of old things, so that they are no longer surprising or disturbing. 
By contrast, the world-in-itself, if there is the one, is beyond the possibility 
of familiarization.
The prison of words and the epistemology of nihilism
Language and thought, both with a familiarizing tendency, reinterpret real-
26 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 256.
27 Nietzsche, Genealogy, “First Essay,” §2.
28 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 42.
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ity into what is comprehensible and hence maneuverable. Such prejudiced 
conceptualizations of the world, the “fictitious categories” based on gram-
mar that we weave into the fabric of the world as if they were “naturally 
valid,” both bound us and push us in the pursuit of truth and meaning “to-
wards nothing at all.”29 This is what Strong refers to as our epistemology of 
nihilism within the prison of words: in expressing our “will to truth,” we find 
“both that there is no truth and that [we] should continue to seek it”; “the 
present structure of human life forces men to continue searching for that 
which their understanding tells them is not to be found.”30 We are essential-
ly linguistic and moral beings, who cannot help but search for subjects and 
causes—for the ones responsible—because “we still have faith in grammar” 
and we cannot stop believing in grammar so long as we cannot cease to be 
humans who speak, think, and experience the world in language.31
On the one hand we do not desire to escape, because “survival it-
self requires such illusions and metaphors,” and because our bodies are so 
driven that we would rather will to nothingness than not will to anything.32 
On the other hand, we cannot escape: “the present structure of our thought 
leads us to approach knowledge and truth in a manner such that we can 
never be content.”33 Any manner by which we may attempt to unshackle 
ourselves will only be a further affirmation of our fetters, because everything 
we may do is colored by the tincture of words and concepts.34 We cannot act 
without thinking, and in thinking we think in a certain, ultimately nihilistic, 
way. Just as burning is the essence of fire, unlike what the linguistic expres-
sion “Fire burns” may superficially suggest, so convincing oneself with the 
thought “I speak” does not make it true that what one does essentially does 
not include speaking; it does not make it true that speech is some accidental 
activity that is blinding and weighing one down and could be freely given 
29 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 249.
30 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 259.
31 Nietzsche, Twilight, “Reason,” §5.
32 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 257; Nietzsche, Genealogy, “Third Essay,” 
§1.
33 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 257.
34 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 259.
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up. Any resistance to this fact about our own nature will only result in de-
structive self-negation, which Nietzsche believes is already an “uncurable 
sickness” of us “Western humans.”35
Thus “language pulls together and is the world: this language, our 
world”; the world is “our own making” insofar as we are the maker of our 
language.36 Our language fundamentally determines and influences the way 
we see and grasp the world, and our thus linguistically determined con-
sciousness observes the world as causal and itself as free and absolute. In 
looking at the world in such a way, we embrace an ideology which tells us 
that there is a genuine reality behind all appearances, a transcendental be-
yond the natural, a God or Truth that is the primary and original cause of 
all causes, and to which responsibility for all of being can be attributed—yet 
in such a self-defeating project we are in error.
Nevertheless, as Strong prefaces his discussion, the dilemma which 
Nietzsche leaves us with is not without hope of resolution: Nietzsche him-
self has “dreams of either removing from language those qualities which he 
saw as the message and herald of nihilism…[or], even more radically, of 
revolutionizing discourse into a new language which would rest on a rad-
ically different grammar.”37 In fact, as Nietzsche himself sees it, his advent 
in philosophy has already marked the nascent moment of a world in which 
reality is pictured anew in a language that does not compel us to nihilistic 
pursuits of Truth.
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35 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 259.
36 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 255 and 257.
37 Strong, “Language and Nihilism,” 243-44.
